With the United States’ commitment to European security increasingly uncertain, and Russia’s nuclear threats intensifying, a vital debate is resurfacing across the continent: Can—and should—Europe develop its own independent nuclear deterrent?
By InDepthReports Staff
As the reliability of U.S. security guarantees becomes less certain and Russia’s nuclear saber-rattling grows more menacing, a once-taboo question has returned to the heart of European strategic debate: Can and should Europe build its own independent nuclear deterrent?
The question is deceptively simple. Europe, home to two nuclear powers France and the United Kingdom—has the technological means, industrial capacity, and threat perception necessary to develop a deterrent. But the political, strategic, and institutional hurdles remain steep. What’s more, the real issue may not be whether Europe can, but whether it must.
The Case for Deterrence in a New Security Era
Since Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the strategic landscape of the continent has transformed. Moscow’s repeated nuclear threats—explicit and implicit—have added a terrifying dimension to what is already the most destructive war in Europe since 1945. With a potential second Trump presidency on the horizon, and growing uncertainty over whether Washington would trade “Boston for Berlin,” Europeans are reconsidering the foundations of their security.
“Deterring such contingency is necessary,” argues Michal Onderco of Erasmus University. “But Europeans should focus on conventional forces that make any Russian land grab in Eastern Europe impossible in the first place. Nuclear deterrence comes second—and it already exists.”
Onderco and others caution against over-relying on nuclear weapons. Yet if Washington disengages, and Moscow continues to escalate, can French and British arsenals alone provide the psychological and strategic reassurance currently anchored in the U.S. nuclear umbrella?
France and the UK: A Limited but Viable Starting Point
France and the United Kingdom each maintain credible, survivable nuclear forces. France’s force de frappe includes air-launched nuclear cruise missiles (ASMP-A) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), while the UK relies solely on a fleet of four nuclear-powered submarines armed with Trident missiles.
“Both have enough weapons to inflict unacceptable damage on Russia,” says Paul van Hooft of RAND Europe. “The difficulties lie in deterring low- or medium-intensity Russian actions at the edges of NATO.”
The French and British deterrents were designed to protect their own national territories, not to serve as continent-wide umbrellas. Adapting them to reassure and deter on behalf of the broader European community would require more than just capability. It would demand strategic reinvention, doctrinal evolution, and political trust.
The Real Challenge: Strategy, Trust, and Escalation
France, in particular, has historically viewed its nuclear force as a sovereign asset of last resort—not a tool for extended deterrence or alliance reassurance. “France has never thought about its nuclear weapons in terms of escalation management,” notes Professor Onderco, “but as the ultimate punishment for an invader.”
Similarly, while the UK has nominally committed its deterrent to NATO since the 1960s, questions remain over its sufficiency in a vastly altered strategic environment. “The capacity to rapidly enhance UK nuclear capabilities is limited,” warns Professor Andrew Futter. “Developing new platforms or expanding warhead stockpiles would take years, not weeks.”
Beyond force structure, credibility remains the core challenge. Would Paris or London risk national annihilation for the sake of Warsaw or Tallinn?
“In theory, France and the UK might find it easier than Washington to answer this question affirmatively,” argues James Acton of the Carnegie Endowment. “After all, a Russian invasion of Europe poses a more direct threat to them.” But deterrence is not merely logical—it is performative. It must be believed by adversaries, allies, and domestic populations alike.
The Illusion—and Danger—of the Eurobomb
While calls for a shared European nuclear deterrent have surfaced periodically—particularly after Brexit—most experts warn against the fantasy of a pan-European nuclear force, or what Héloïse Fayet calls the “traveling nuclear suitcase between EU capitals.”
“The European Union is not equipped to handle collective nuclear decision-making,” says Alexander Bollfrass of IISS. “NATO is—but it doesn’t offer independence from the United States.”
Attempting to build a “Eurobomb” would require enormous investment, generate treaty violations, provoke backlash, and expose Europe to sabotage or military strikes. “Europe would get more deterrence from fielding conventional forces, especially precision long-range strike,” Bollfrass adds.
Even extending France’s arsenal to cover Europe—a prospect floated by President Macron—comes with red lines. Paris has historically opposed shared decision-making or stationing warheads outside its territory. And while the UK remains committed to NATO, its exit from the EU casts doubt on its political will to serve as Europe’s nuclear protector.
What About Poland or Germany?
Could frontline states like Poland or Germany pursue their own deterrents? Legally, such a move would violate the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Politically, it would provoke fierce resistance from neighboring states, undermine EU unity, and potentially invite Russian aggression.
“Would Russia be more indulgent of such programs than Israel has been toward Iran, Syria, or Iraq?” asks George Perkovich. “Would Russian intelligence, sabotage, or even preemptive strikes follow?”
While a Polish deterrent might be “highly credible,” van Hooft admits, “the route there is unfortunately very dangerous.”
The Sensible Path: Strengthen What Exists
Instead of reinventing the nuclear wheel, most analysts agree that Europe should focus on deepening coordination between France and the UK, improving conventional deterrence, and enhancing the credibility of existing nuclear umbrellas.
That would include:
- Strategic clarity from Paris and London, particularly in how they define their “vital interests.”
- Forward deployment of French and British forces to NATO’s Eastern flank to signal commitment.
- Investment in air-delivered substrategic options to deter Russian use of tactical nuclear weapons.
- Conventional buildup across Europe to raise the threshold for any Russian adventurism.
- Joint financing mechanisms to support deterrence efforts without violating the NPT.
Crucially, as Fayet argues, the focus should shift away from numbers and toward posture. “Instead of obsessing over warhead numbers, why not start by reinforcing French deployments on NATO’s Eastern flank?”
A Question of Will, Not Just Weapons
Yes, Europe can build its own independent nuclear deterrent. The capabilities are there. But that is the wrong question.
The real question is: Can Europe build the political will, cohesion, and strategic vision necessary to credibly deter Moscow in a world where Washington might walk away?
The answer will not come in kilotons, but in choices—about conventional force posture, diplomatic unity, strategic communication, and institutional trust. Europe may not need a new bomb. But it does need a new plan.