After the high-stakes Alaska and Washington summits, Europe has managed to hold the line, buying time and keeping Ukraine at the centre of transatlantic diplomacy. Yet, Trump’s commitment remains a doubt, Putin will continue to disrupt the process and the battle over security guarantees is only beginning. Four snapshots from EUISS experts capture where we stand.
Europe lives to fight another day. By sending the ‘top team’ of European leaders, each well-versed in the art of handling Donald Trump, Europe has managed to shift a political dynamic that was dangerous and harmful to Ukraine and broader European interests.
In Alaska, President Trump not only rolled out the red carpet for President Putin but also adopted core Kremlin positions on the origins of the war and how it should end. He had arrived promising to push for a ceasefire and to impose “severe consequences” if Putin refused. He left portraying Ukraine as the obstacle to peace and proposing it make alarming territorial concessions. There was a fear across Europe that during President Zelensky’s visit to the White House, Trump would dictate unacceptable terms for an unjust settlement – or simply withdraw US support and walk away.
But things went better in Washington, thanks to some deft European diplomacy. President Zelensky threaded the needle by playing to Trump’s wish to be seen as the ultimate peacemaker and by stressing that any peace needed to be sustainable and enforceable. The other European leaders came in behind and made all the right points: that Ukraine’s fate is inseparable from wider European and transatlantic security, that robust guarantees are essential for any agreement to endure, and that Putin must finally negotiate directly with Zelensky.
The critical next step is to define the now dangerously vague proposals for security guarantees – clarifying what concrete commitments European countries and the United States are prepared to make. Equally important is to push for future negotiations to be held on European soil, with Ukraine and Europe playing their full part. After Anchorage and Washington, why not Geneva?
And Europa needs a Plan B. Trump seems serious about giving these negotiations a go, but his basic unreliability undermines trust among transatlantic partners. Should Trump throw in the towel and say ‘over to you, Europe’, we must be able to say ‘we got this’. European leaders need to think in these terms and prepare themselves accordingly.
Have Europeans found a way of managing transatlantic uncertainty?
Giuseppe Spatafora
When Trump announced the Anchorage Summit, many in Europe were worried of slipping back to the situation of February-March: back then, they had little influence over the US President, and couldn’t prevent him and his advisors from attacking Zelensky and blaming Ukraine for the war. Trump’s more benign approach to Kyiv and Europe was at risk of disappearing.
The past few days illustrated how transatlantic dynamics have changed, both in positive and negative terms. US-Europe relations are now characterised by deep mistrust and uncertainty: allies and partners cannot take Trump’s commitment for granted. Every meeting in which Europeans are not present could result in a major policy shift. Trump can be easily swayed by his personal relationship with Putin. His cabinet is filled with restrainers who will continue to push for reduced US commitments to Ukraine and Europe. Trump could use other issues like trade imbalances or tech regulation as excuse to question contributions to European security – as he has before.
At the same time, European leaders seem to have found a way of dealing with the uncertainty and mistrust. By talking to Trump relentlessly, mixing praise for his initiative with concrete worries about Putin’s promises, and showing a united front, they prevented the worst outcomes. They were able to win a few concessions – like a US commitment to security guarantees for Ukraine, and future weapons sales. And Trump praised the leaders, including the EU – which only a few months ago he claimed was “made to screw us”.
This equilibrium may not last, for many reasons. The MAGA base rose up in arms to protest new commitments to Ukraine – which pushed Trump to “assure” his supporters on Fox News that American troops will not be sent. The contours of the security arrangements remain very vague, and have not yet resulted in meaningful resource allocation from Washington. And significant progress depends on the Kremlin’s cooperation, which remains very unlikely.
Through persistent and personal diplomacy, EU leaders have maintained a united front with the US on Ukraine. They seem to have found a way to make transatlantic relations work in a climate of mistrust. They should keep it up, and apply the format to other policy areas. But Trump’s position remains uncertain and prone to change.
Russians won’t give up the battle for Trump’s mind
Ondrej Ditrych
Europeans struck back. Instead of handing over the unoccupied Donbas, Zelensky came with a bold counterproposal for a USD 100 billion purchase of weapons (off the European purse) and an ambitious drone partnership with U.S. companies worth another USD 50 billion. And it appears that instead of punishing Zelensky for moving against his will, Trump listened. Thanks to other European leaders, security guarantees are now discussed in a Transatlantic setting for the first time. Trump even phoned Viktor Orbán to ask why Hungary is redlighting opening accession talks which once complete would see Ukraine covered by the Union’s common defence clause.
Yet one would better be cautious. Positions sometimes shift rapidly these days; less so, key players’ fundamental interests. Russia still wants to liquidate Ukraine’s sovereignty and restore its empire in Eastern Europe. If a temporary break on its aggression would yield gains that would make achieving this aim eventually more likely – with Ukraine’s defences undermined and some sanctions removed – why would the Kremlin not accept it and embrace “peace” for just as long as it felt like it?
But if, as is the case now, the U.S. position toward Russia appears to be toughening, Moscow will seek to subvert the process. So sure, Moscow wants peace above all – but while last week it was a peace agreement right away, now Lavrov insists that a number of steps need to be taken first (translation: Ukraine accepting Russia’s conditions including “denazification“, meaning acceptance of a vassal status). Security guarantees? Absolutely, but these could only be activated in a multilateral format where each participant, Russia included, would have a veto power. And did you forget that we have always said “no Western boots on the ground” in Ukraine?
The Kremlin must not be underestimated at this critical moment. People running the process are not unerring master chess players. They suffer from cognitive biases. They also have to countenance Russia’s structural vulnerabilities. But they are skilled, experienced, cunning and have killer instincts. If they can’t get Trump to help them pressure Ukraine into making major concessions , they will do what they can to disengage him. The task of Europeans is both simple and difficult: to keep the White House interested, and on their side of the fence.
Progress but no breakthrough on security guarantees
Luigi Scazzieri
The question of security guarantees is critical to any discussion over how Russia’s war on Ukraine will end. Ukraine will not stop fighting unless it has credible assurances that its Western partners will come to its aid if Russia attacks again. But putting together a credible reassurance force without the US is proving challenging for Europeans, because of a lack of critical military capabilities traditionally provided by America and politically.
The summit in Washington marked a significant change in terms of America’s willingness to be involved in policing any ceasefire. Trump had previously rejected the idea, but his position has now shifted. He has stated that Europeans would be in the lead but that the US would also help, perhaps by providing air support. Detailed European-US conversations at the military level are now taking place, to flesh out the degree of practical support that the US could provide to enable a European mission – and what it would do if Russia attacked it. As the picture on the US side becomes clearer, so will the willingness of the members of the so-called ‘coalition of the willing’ to contribute, and the precise composition and mandate of a European-led force. A mission focused on air defence, training and maritime security now appears like the likeliest scenario, though a larger deployment is still conceivable.
While there is now momentum behind the idea of security guarantees, it is too early to call this a breakthrough. Military planning remains subordinate to diplomacy, in the sense that the US could still back off from the idea. At the same time, a deployment of Western forces in Ukraine remains conditional on Russia agreeing to a ceasefire first, and there is little sign of Moscow being willing to do so on terms acceptable to Ukraine. Indeed, the more concrete and ambitious plans for security guarantees are, more likely Moscow is to reject a ceasefire. In that sense, planning for a reassurance force is part of diplomacy, as Moscow’s reticence helps Europeans persuade Trump that Putin is the obstacle to peace. In the meantime, the best thing Europeans can do to support Ukraine’s defence is to redouble their efforts to keep it supplied.