The NDS and the posture review are two related but separate documents. The former determines US defence priorities and objectives, and provides broad military guidance for defence planning and force structure. The latter assesses how many US forces are deployed globally and where. It ensures that the distribution of forces aligns with strategic objectives – often influenced by the latest NDS but operationally focused. Each US administration produces its own NDS and posture review: the Biden administration released its NDS in 2022 and posture review in late 2021.
In Trump’s world, a week can equal a world of difference. In early July, the US Department of Defense (DoD) halted deliveries of precision munitions and air defence systems to Ukraine as part of a stockpile review – leaving Kyiv more exposed to Russian missile and drone attacks. A few days later, Trump reversed the order, claiming that Ukrainians ‘have to be able to defend themselves‘, and that he had not been informed of the decision to suspend arms shipments. On Monday 14 July, the President went even further, agreeing to sell new weapons to European NATO allies so they could keep Ukraine supplied.
This volte-face has reignited hopes in Europe that Trump can be persuaded to abandon his restrainer instincts and remain committed to European security, through a combination of diplomatic flattery and signals of commitment like pledging to spend 5% of GDP on defence. This may lead some to believe that the new National Defence Strategy (NDS) and global force posture review – both expected between late summer and autumn(1) – will also be more favourable to Europeans.
These reviews will determine the direction of US defence policy for the rest of Trump’s second mandate.
These hopes might be misplaced. Unlike the decision to freeze weapons deliveries to Ukraine, which would normally be coordinated through the National Security Council but apparently was not, the force posture review and NDS are clearly a task for the Pentagon. And the DoD’s leadership falls squarely within the ‘restrainer‘ camp – placed there to deliver on Trump’s ‘America First’ agenda. The chief architect of both reviews, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby, has advocated for scaling back America’s global military engagement, hard burden-shifting to allies, and a reprioritisation of US objectives. These reviews will determine the direction of US defence policy for the rest of Trump’s second mandate. It will be harder to reverse course on them, even for Trump himself.
America First in practice
The NDS and the posture review are two related but separate documents. The former determines US defence priorities and objectives, and provides broad military guidance for defence planning and force structure. The latter assesses how many US forces are deployed globally and where. It ensures that the distribution of forces aligns with strategic objectives – often influenced by the latest NDS but operationally focused. Each US administration produces its own NDS and posture review: the Biden administration released its NDS in 2022 and posture review in late 2021.
European allies have been inquiring about American plans, especially for the posture review, since it would affect the size of the (expected) cuts to US forces and weapons in the European theatre. However, US planners have been reluctant to share details about the draft plans. This is a stark departure from the approach of the Biden administration – which, for instance, reversed plans for a 12 000-troop withdrawal from Germany in its posture review after talks with Berlin. While US representatives and the NATO Secretary General insist that the documents will contain ‘no surprises‘, the absence of meaningful transatlantic coordination suggests otherwise.
US planners have been reluctant to share details about the draft plans.
Leaked versions of the Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance, a short document that guides policy in the administration’s early months, provide some clues on what to expect. The US should prioritise the deterrence of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, and hence presence in the Indo-Pacific. To accomplish this, the US will ‘assume risk’ in Europe and the Middle East – that is, leave an insufficient number of forces in those theatres and rely on allied contributions.
Apparently, the text is very much inspired by the defence chapter of Project 2025, which argues that conventional force planning to counter China must come ‘before allocating resources to other missions, such as simultaneously fighting another conflict.’ The armed forces should also focus on the defence of the US homeland, not only from missile attacks but also from illegal border crossings and drug trafficking – and cooperate closely with the Department of Homeland Security. This shift of focus will entail massive burden-shifting to allies in theatres considered secondary by Washington.
This shift of focus will entail massive burden-shifting to allies in theatres considered secondary by Washington.
Other clues come from defence allocations in the 2025 reconciliation law – the so-called ‘big beautiful bill‘. The bill adds USD 150 billion to the DoD budget for specific activities which reflect the administration’s core priorities. The largest expenditure categories are shipbuilding – hinting at preparation for a naval war in the Indo-Pacific – and the ‘Golden Dome‘ missile defence system, followed by munitions, drone and AI capabilities, nuclear modernisation, and contributions to border security. Finally, the legislation funds capability development for Indo-Pacific command (INDOPACOM), but makes no such provisions for other theatres.
Hope for the best, prepare for the worst
The likely direction of US defence priorities will have major implications for Europe.
Questions remain regarding the scale and speed of any major changes resulting from the posture review: the DoD could start by identifying capabilities currently based in Europe that would be more useful in the Indo-Pacific theatre or in North America, without touching others. Or it might opt for broader redeployments that would affect NATO’s current deterrent posture. A sudden drawdown might affect the implementation of the new NATO capability targets, which the alliance has just agreed on.
The implications are also significant for the defence industry. The NDS could direct the defence industry to prioritise production of assets suited for a naval war in Asia, even if that means delaying deliveries to European allies. That could also affect the Patriot batteries and interceptors that Trump promised to backfill to European countries who move their own air defence assets to Ukraine. These bottlenecks may only become apparent when it is too late to respond effectively.
Asudden drawdown might affect the implementation of the new NATO capability targets
Europeans should take these factors into account in their current planning. For instance, while they should provide available air defences for Ukraine, following the recent agreement, they should also take steps to diversify the replacements – not only with Patriots but also with European alternatives. They should also prepare additional contributions to the alliance’s command structure and prepositioned brigades to make up for reductions in US personnel.
While Trump appears more open to supporting Ukraine, the restrainer wing remains strong – and will most likely influence the administration’s key strategic reviews. Europeans should be clear-eyed about the likely outcome of this process and its implications. If not, they might feel the impact only when it is too late.