This investigation reveals how Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drones, supplied through a secret $150 million deal between defense company Baykar and the Sudanese army, have fueled Sudan’s escalating war in violation of the UN arms embargo. Shipping records, satellite imagery, and field evidence link Ankara directly to drone strikes that killed hundreds of civilians in Darfur and Kordofan. Far from a mere arms transfer, the deal reflects Turkey’s broader bid to expand its influence over Port Sudan, Sudan’s gold sector, and regional geopolitics—turning the country into a testing ground for new weapons while civilians pay the highest price.
Khartoum, London, Istanbul
In the summer of 2025, as Sudan’s bloody conflict escalated, footage emerged showing drones flying over civilian-populated areas in Darfur and Kordofan. These were not ordinary drones; they bore the distinctive features of Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2s, which had already gained notoriety in the wars of Libya, Azerbaijan, and Ukraine.
Their appearance sparked urgent questions: How did such advanced military systems reach a country under a United Nations arms embargo since 2004? And who is behind arming the Sudanese army despite U.S. and European sanctions imposed on warring factions?
This investigation uncovers the hidden threads of a secret $150 million arms deal between Turkish defense company Baykar and the Sudanese army, which involved the delivery of Bayraktar TB2 drones and smart guided munitions. We trace the full path of the deal: from Ankara to Port Sudan, from political negotiations to deadly airstrikes that killed civilians.
From Partner to Military Beneficiary
Since the fall of Omar al-Bashir’s regime in 2019, Sudan has slipped into political chaos and military division. For Ankara, Sudan was not simply another war-torn country but a strategic opportunity to expand its influence across the Red Sea. Retired Brigadier General Abdel Rahim Ismail, a former Sudanese army officer, put it bluntly: “The army is the guarantor of Turkey’s interests in Sudan. Without the army, Ankara cannot sustain its projects in ports or mining.”
One of the main pillars of this relationship lies in the strategic control of ports. The Sudanese army dominates the Red Sea coastline, including Port Sudan, the nation’s most critical economic artery. As Sudanese Red Sea expert Dr. Abdel Rahim Bilal explained: “Turkey knows that whoever controls Port Sudan holds the keys to Sudan’s economy. Supporting the army means gaining access to the port through the front door.” But Ankara’s calculus extended beyond maritime trade. The Sudanese army also commands vast economic fronts, particularly in gold and mining, where military-linked companies have granted lucrative exploration contracts to Turkish firms such as Turkgold Ltd. According to mining researcher Khaled Al-Tayeb, “The army is the main player in Sudan’s gold sector. Any deal with the army opens the door to profitable mining contracts and partnerships with Turkish companies.”
The partnership also carried a clear geopolitical dimension. Politically, Ankara saw the army as a strategic shield against the competing influence of Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, both of which have provided varying levels of support to the rival Rapid Support Forces. Washington-based Sudanese analyst Ahmed Hussein summarized the logic: “Turkey regarded the army as a strategic ally against rival Arab blocs. The drones were not just military tools but also a regional political message.”
For these reasons, Turkey’s involvement in Sudan was never limited to a simple arms deal. The Bayraktar TB2 drones became a powerful symbol of an expanding alliance linking weapons supplies to economic concessions, and positioning Ankara as an assertive regional actor determined to outmaneuver its rivals.
Image Caption: A Bayraktar TB2 drone manufactured by Baykar, the Turkish defense and aerospace company.
The Deal’s Trail… From Ankara to Khartoum
According to documents reviewed by the investigation team, the first negotiations began in the spring of 2022 between representatives of Sudan’s Ministry of Defense and the Turkish defense company Baykar. Talks were conducted through Turkish intermediaries registered in Istanbul, including a company directly tied to Selçuk Bayraktar, Baykar’s CEO and son-in-law of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The final agreement stipulated the delivery of six Bayraktar TB2 drones along with ground control stations, in addition to laser-guided munitions of the MAM-L and MAM-C types, as well as a two-year training and maintenance program. The total deal was estimated at $150–180 million.
By October 2024, Baykar had already supplied Sudan with at least eight Bayraktar TB2 drones and related warheads, with a combined value exceeding $150 million.
To shield the deal from scrutiny, it was legally packaged under the label of “surveillance and reconnaissance equipment.” Shipments left Mersin Port in Turkey and arrived by sea at Port Sudan, where they were officially registered as “electronic equipment and agricultural reconnaissance drones.”
Our team obtained copies of Sudanese customs records showing container numbers that matched Turkish shipping documents tied to Baykar—clear evidence that what was presented as civilian trade was, in reality, a military transfer. Turkish defense industry researcher Mustafa Kayajan explained: “Using designations like agricultural equipment or monitoring systems is a common tactic to circumvent sanctions. But matching container numbers with Baykar’s shipping logs makes denial nearly impossible.” He added that the arms deal was formally signed by Mirghani Idris Suleiman, Director-General of Sudan’s Military Industry Corporation, on November 16, 2023 five months after the United States imposed new sanctions.
A European diplomat in Khartoum confirmed to the investigation team that the European Union was aware of ‘sensitive shipments’ passing through Port Sudan, but could not stop them due to the absence of any effective oversight mechanism at the port. The diplomat warned: “What is most concerning is that these drones were never registered as combat systems but as civilian tools. This is a blatant violation of the UN arms embargo on Sudan that has been in place since 2004.”
Image Caption: Map showing zones of control and conflict from ACLED.
Field Evidence – From Sky to Ground
In December 2023 and January 2024, five videos circulated on social media showing drones striking targets in North Kordofan and West Darfur. The investigation team analyzed the footage using geolocation techniques and confirmed that the strikes took place near El Fasher and on the outskirts of Al-Geneina.
The shadows of the drones visible in the clips, along with their flight patterns, matched the characteristics of Bayraktar TB2s. The explosions and the type of shrapnel were also clear indicators of Turkish-made MAM-L munitions. Satellite imagery taken in January 2024 revealed circular craters about two meters in diameter—consistent with the footprint of MAM-L strikes, according to weapons experts. At one strike site, investigators found metallic debris marked MAM-L/23-48291, which matched a production batch from Turkey’s Roketsan in May 2023.
Laurent Laniel, a weapons expert with the EU Agency for Drugs and Crime, explained: “When you see these circular craters and this type of shrapnel, there is no doubt. These are MAM-L munitions, used exclusively with Bayraktar TB2 drones.”
Local testimonies reinforced these findings. Adam Abdel Karim, 38, from El Fasher, survived a strike on a popular market in North Darfur. He told the investigation team: “We heard the drone circling for hours, then the bomb fell in the middle of the market. There were no fighters—just women buying vegetables and children playing… More than forty people died in an instant.”
Image Caption: Still from a video documenting the strike, shared by an employee of a Turkish arms company with his manager after Bayraktar drones were delivered to the Sudanese army.
At another attack site on December 23, 2023, near Al-Geneina, investigators once again found metallic debris marked MAM-L/23-48291. Export records from the European arms database SIPRI confirmed it belonged to a Roketsan batch produced in May 2023.
According to reports from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), a single strike in North Darfur killed 42 civilians, including 12 children. Another witness told the investigation team by phone: “We heard the drone circling for hours… then the bomb dropped in the middle of the market. There were no fighters, only vegetable sellers and women buying food.”
Image Caption: Bayraktar drones deployed at Sudanese army bases, used in strikes against civilians in Sudan.
Human rights organizations and several international monitors have accused the Sudanese army of deploying Turkish drones, along with other weapons, to deliberately target civilians in Darfur and Kordofan. International weapons monitor Laurent Laniel emphasized that the drones were not limited to combat roles:
“They were systematically used to bomb markets and villages, in an effort to weaken the civilian base of support for the Rapid Support Forces.”
He added: “The growing body of evidence indicates that the Sudanese army used armed drones in unlawful attacks targeting populated civilian areas. This amounts to war crimes.”
Breaking the International Embargo
Since the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1591 in 2004, Sudan has been subject to a strict arms embargo prohibiting the export of combat systems or military technologies to the country. Any transfer of armed equipment such as combat drones constitutes a direct violation of this ban.
Financial and human assessments indicate that the Baykar deal was worth around $150 million, covering six Bayraktar TB2 drones, guided munitions, and training and maintenance programs. Operational costs were estimated at about $50,000 per flight hour per drone. Meanwhile, local monitoring groups in Darfur estimate that more than 200 civilians have been killed since these drones were first deployed.
Dr. Nicolas Laurent, professor of international law at the University of Geneva, explained:
“If it is proven that Baykar concluded the deal while being aware that the drones would be used in Darfur, this places the company under potential criminal liability under international law—on top of Turkey’s political and moral responsibility.”
Sudanese lawyer Riham Abdel Rahman described the situation as a double crime:
“It is not only a violation of UN resolutions but also indirect participation in war crimes committed against civilians. International law is clear: the supplier bears responsibility once aware of the weapon’s final destination.”
A report issued in February 2024 by the UN Panel of Experts on Sudan noted “growing evidence of foreign drones being used in the Darfur conflict,” stressing that such deployment represents a serious breach of the arms embargo that has been in place for two decades.
Shadow Fleet
All the evidence from shipping documents and satellite imagery to munition debris and civilian testimonies—points to one conclusion: Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones played a decisive role in fueling Sudan’s conflict.
Image Caption: Wreckage of a Turkish-made Akinci (HALE) drone, belonging to the Sudanese Armed Forces, shot down by the Rapid Support Forces near El Fasher, North Darfur.
The image shows a parabolic antenna unit from the drone’s wreckage, clearly bearing a label from Baykar, the Turkish drone manufacturer:
Serial Number (SN): 280423-09-0002
NATO Stock Number (NSN): 5985-27-071-3127
NCAGE Code: T9710 (indicating Turkish origin)
As Sudan’s war drags on, the threads of this secret arms deal have gone far beyond ordinary commerce. They have become part of a complex geopolitical project, turning Sudan into a testing ground for Turkey’s weapons industry. The Bayraktar TB2 has thus played a central role in prolonging Sudan’s bloody war.
More alarming is the fact that these drones were not just military tools on a battlefield they embodied a grim reality in which civilians were reduced to mere targets. Women and children were bombed in markets and villages far from any legitimate military objectives.
All of this represents a direct violation of UN Security Council resolutions and the arms embargo in place since 2004. It raises urgent questions about the absence of international oversight mechanisms and the ability of defense companies to circumvent laws under the guise of civilian trade and dubious contracts.
Sudanese lawyer Riham Abdel Rahman stressed: “What we are witnessing is not just a legal breach, but indirect participation in war crimes. International law does not absolve suppliers once they know the weapon’s final destination.”
What is unfolding in Sudan goes far beyond the tragedy of a single country. It is a stark example of how loopholes in international law are exploited to transform internal conflicts into testing grounds for new weapons. In this grim reality, civilians become the expendable fuel of regional and global power struggles.